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Evidence from nationalist movements in Scotland and
Northern Ireland shows that pragmatism and the ability to
adapt are key to electoral success, and that nationalism is
still a potent political force.
Contemporary political analysis tends to draw few comparisons between nationalist
movements in Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, Eve Hepburn and P. J.
McLoughlin argue that in both cases, such movements have adopted variously pro-
European positions in order to benefit from opportunities for aid and for greater political
representation, and have thus successfully moderated their nationalist ambitions.
There has been a great deal of analysis written comparing the activities of stateless
nationalist and regionalist parties across states, but there are few concerning parties that
operate within them. In the UK context, political scientists usually have a preference to
compare conflicts in Northern Ireland with other ‘conflict regions’ such as the Basque
Country or Palestine, whilst ignoring comparisons with more peaceful nationalist movements
in Great Britain. In recent decades, these movements, as well as those that operate across
states, have taken advantage of opportunities for greater European integration. This has
become an important part of stateless politics in Europe.
Both the Scottish National Party (SNP), and Northern Ireland’s Social Democratic and Labour
Party (SDLP), have sought to use the opportunities of European integration to advance their
particular constitutional agenda – independence or greater autonomy from the UK state for
the SNP, and Irish reunification for the SDLP.
There are remarkable similarities between the SNP and the SDLP. Obviously the two parties operate in very
different political contexts – although Scotland has similar religious cleavages to those in Northern Ireland,
the challenges which these have created for the SNP appear negligible when compared to the violent
sectarian conflict with which the SDLP has contended. However, both parties have sought to transcend
religious divisions by articulating a liberal and inclusive nationalism. And it was this progressive brand of
nationalism which allowed each party to embrace the ideals and practices of the EU – a project rooted in a
rejection of extreme nationalism in favour of more pluralist conceptions of identity and political organisation.
Of course, it was not this alone that encouraged the SNP and SDLP to adopt pro-European positions. The
considerable monetary aid that could be accrued from Brussels by peripheral regions such as Scotland and
Northern Ireland; the opportunities to gain political representation and present the Scottish or Irish nationalist
case in political fora beyond the UK state; and the chance to augment those cases by making alliances with
other regional nationalist parties in Europe – all of these factors played a part in drawing the SNP and SDLP
into a pro-European embrace. This was most evident in the late 1980s, when the “Europe of the Regions”
movement was at its height. Though the aims of this movement were never clearly defined, essentially it
advocated a radical restructuring of the European nation-state system, reducing the power of central
governments in a way that would allow regional and peripheral nationalisms to flourish. Both the SNP and the
SDLP flirted with such ideas as they sought to make their proposals – for a Scotland independent from the
UK, or a united Ireland without British support – more politically acceptable and economically viable.
However, there were also differences between the SNP and the SDLP in terms of their relationships with
Europe. Most notably, the SNP’s pro-Europeanism only really became apparent in the 1980s – a time when it
was particularly “vogue” for regional nationalist actors across Europe. By contrast, the SDLP, formed in 1970
by activists from Northern Ireland’s idealist “civil rights generation”, was pro-European from the outset. This
was evident in the party’s very first proposals for a peaceful settlement in Northern Ireland, published in
1972, which noted the role which inter-European co-operation might play in bringing together the two parts
of Ireland. The SDLP continued to develop such ideas in subsequent years, submitting more radical, even
“post-nationalist” proposals to the peace talks of the 1990s.
In contrast, the SNP was already moving away from its dalliance with the Europe of Regions project, noting
the failure of EU regional institutions, such as the Committee of the Regions, to win any substantial rights for
regions in Europe. Some sections of the SNP also began to question the nature of European integration,
demanding the return of certain Common Policy areas to national or regional authorities, such as fishing and
agriculture. Indeed, during the debates on the draft European Constitution in 2004, the SNP maintained that
it would campaign against this document in protest against the Common Fisheries Policy, which was seen to
undermine Scottish interests. The SNP’s move to a more ‘Euro-critical’ position was reminiscent of the party’s
pre-1980s stance, when it viewed the EU as a distant, bureaucratic and centralist organisation.
This divergence of approach suggested significant differences in the two parties’ thinking on Europe. The
SDLP’s commitment to Europe was more rooted, and part of its formative ideals. Certainly, its pro-
Europeanism won the party important allies at Strasbourg, and much needed economic support for Northern
Ireland’s conflict-damaged economy in the 1980s and ’90s. But even after the party lost its only European
seat in 2004 – at a time when Brussels’ generous financial support for Northern Ireland was beginning to be
scaled back, with funds being redirected to the needier new EU states of the East – the SDLP continued to
argue for the expansion and deepening of the integrationist project. By contrast, the SNP was actually
opposed to European integration until the early 1980s. In the 1975 referendum on continued UK
membership of the EEC, the SNP campaigned on the theme ‘no voice, no entry’, perceiving integration as a
centralising tendency that concentrated powers in the hands of the UK government.
Certainly, the SNP became more positive about Europe in the 1980s, helped by the election of SNP
members to the European Parliament and the reform of European structural policy that brought in
considerable funds to Scotland. This change in attitude enabled the SNP to articulate a discourse of
‘independence in Europe’ (which, in a way, sought to replace the framework of the UK state with that of the
EU). However, there remained a section within the party that was sceptical of any sort of larger political
organisation – be it the UK state or the EU – that had the potential to encroach on Scottish self-
determination.
These differences – crudely put, between a principled and more pragmatic approach to Europe – also help
to explain the recent divergence in the respective electoral fortunes of the SNP and SDLP. After forming the
main opposition in the first two sessions of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 and 2003, the SNP formed
minority government in 2007, before enjoying a stunning electoral victory in 2011, securing a historic
majority with 69 out of 129 seats in the Scottish Parliament. By contrast, the SDLP, for a long time the
dominant party in Northern Ireland’s nationalist community, now comes a poor second to Sinn Féin. This is
also interesting because of the SNP’s and SDLP’s relationship with the respective constitutional
arrangements in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Though devolution to Scotland was obviously a response to nationalist agitation, the current settlement is
not a creature of Scottish nationalism’s creation. Rather it was the progeny of the British political centre, and
specifically the New Labour project. Though it lacks the Conservative Party’s instinctual ideological
commitment to the Union, Labour, and particularly Scottish Labour MPs, have always had greater electoral
incentive to ensure that Scotland remains part of the UK. Thus, the Blair government saw the creation of a
Scottish (and indeed Welsh) parliament as a way of strengthening the Union by reducing the “democratic
deficit” between the regions and UK political centre.
This was certainly not the way the SNP saw the situation. It wanted a more powerful Scottish assembly than
that created in 1998, but had little influence in the early days of devolution, when Labour co-operated with
the Liberals to maintain power in Edinburgh. However, with the decline of the Labour Party in Scotland in
recent years, the SNP has now been able to seize control at Holyrood, and begin pushing for a settlement
more in keeping with its ambitions.
Devolution to Northern Ireland was also achieved by the Blair government, but the particular institutions and
ideas behind the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) – power-sharing between nationalist and unionist parties;
formal recognition of the national identities of both communities; and political linkages and increased co-
operation between the North and South of Ireland – reflected proposals long advocated by the SDLP.
However, though commonly recognised as the key architect of the GFA, the SDLP has not been the electoral
beneficiary of the settlement, having since been eclipsed by its republican rival, Sinn Féin.
As a result, comparison between the SNP and Sinn Féin is now more constructive. Indeed, Sinn Féin’s recent
moderation of its nationalism – so that it now advocates “critical engagement” with the EU – and the SNP’s
retreat from the more nuanced programme it was advocating in the late 1980s, has seen the two come to
rest quite close to one another on the nationalist spectrum. Indeed, the repositioning of both parties leaves
them articulating a rather well-balanced nationalism – assertive but not overly strident; confident and
seemingly constructive. This appears to match the mood of the majority amongst their respective
electorates. Also, the “can do” demeanour of both the SNP and Sinn Féin has led them to dominate
settlements not of their making, but which they now seek to maximise. Thus, the SNP has moved from part-
player, to minority and then majority government in Edinburgh, and aims to use this mandate to push for
greater independence. Meanwhile, though the terms of the GFA mean that Sinn Féin still needs to persuade
Ulster unionists to join a united Ireland – a prospect which appears even less likely given the recent and
astonishing collapse of the Republic’s “Celtic Tiger” economy – the party continues to drive a political
process which is making Northern Ireland ever more accommodating for nationalists.
The apparent lessons from all of this should be familiar to political analysts and historians the world over –
pragmatism and the ability to adapt are key to electoral success; and the power of nationalism is not just a
20th century phenomenon. Nor is nationalism’s contemporary currency limited to less developed countries.
Articulated with appropriate measure, and allied to political competency, it remains a potent force even in
21st century Western Europe.
This blog is based on a recently published article: Celtic Nationalism and Supranationalism: Comparing
Scottish and Northern Ireland Party Responses to Europe.
